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Abstract
This document briefly describes and analyses the IdP Mix-Up at-
tack on OAuth 2.0, as described by Fett, Ku¨sters and Schmitz. We
suggest that a key assumption on which the attack depends is incor-
rect, and as a result the attack does not appear to be a genuine threat
to the security of OAuth 2.0.
1 Introduction
The IETF OAuth 2.0 Working Group has recently released a mitigation1
for the IdP Mix-Up attack, first described by Fett, Ku¨sters and Schmitz,
[1]. Given the serious potential impact of the attack, it is clearly vitally
important to understand in precisely which circumstances the attack could
be performed. This is the main focus of this brief report.
2 The IdP Mix-UP attack
2.1 Operation of the attack
The IdP Mix-Up attack applies to the Implicit Mode flow of OAuth 2.0
[2]. The original description of the attack, taken from section 3.2 of Fett,
Ku¨sters and Schmitz, [1], is given in Fig. 2.1.
In this description, HIdP refers to the ‘honest’ IdP, i.e. the one which the
user chooses to use, and AIdP refers to the ‘attacker’ IdP, i.e. an authorised
but dishonest IdP.
2.2 RP behaviour after redirection
In the underlined text in Fig. 2.1, it is asserted that when the HIdP redi-
rects the user back to the RP, the RP then assumes that the authorization
1http://self-issued.info/?p=1524
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Figure 2.1: IdP Mix-Up attack on Implicit Mode
response is coming from the AIdP and not the HIdP; as a result the RP sub-
sequently submits the access token to the AIdP. This is a key assumption
underlying the IdP Mix-Up attack.
However, we believe that this assumption is incorrect. As specified in
the OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework, [2], the redirect uri defines where
the authorization response should be redirected. The redirect uri defines
the RP’s behaviour after the redirection, in contrast to the implicit but
we believe incorrect assumption in the attack description that the RP’s
behaviour is bound to the first request. In the IdP Mix-Up attack scenario,
the UA will actually be redirected to the redirect uri the RP registered with
the HIdP, as the user is authenticated by the HIdP, and not the redirect uri
the RP registered with the AIdP; hence the RP will submit the access token
to the HIdP not the AIdP. Thus we believe that the IdP Mix-UP attack
will not work, at least as described in Fig. 2.1.
One might argue that the RP might register the same redirect uri with
the AIdP and the HIdP. However, as HTTP is a stateless protocol, the RP
must implement logic to distinguish authorization responses originating from
multiple IdPs. That is, the RP must be able to distinguish authorization
responses received from different IdPs in order to be able to submit the
access token to the correct IdP. Otherwise, the RP will not be able to
determine where the authorization response comes from.
Even if the redirect uri is the same for the two IdPs, as discussed above,
the RP is able to distinguish which IdP has generated the authorization
response, and will submit the access token to the correct IdP to retrieve the
user’s information. As a result, the IdP Mix-Up attack will not work.
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In a small experiment, we checked whether or not RPs register different
redirect uris with different IdPs. In all the cases we examined we were unable
to find an RP that registered the same redirect uri for different IdPs.
2.3 A simple example of the IdP Mix-UP attack
To help explain our concern with the attack, we now describe its operation
in a simple scenario; in this example we use BBC as the RP, Facebook as the
HIdP, and EvilCo as the AIdP (where we suppose that EvilCo is a legitimate
but ill-intentioned IdP). The attack operates as follows.
1. Suppose the user wishes to use Facebook to log in to the BBC web site.
The user clicks the Facebook login button. This will generate a request
to the BBC which indicates that the user wants to use Facebook to
login. The attacker intercepts the request and modifies it to make the
BBC believe that the user wants to use EvilCo to sign in to the BBC.
2. The BBC generates the authorization request for EvilCo, and the at-
tacker intercepts it and changes the client id and redirect uri to the
values the BBC registered with Facebook. This will make the autho-
rization request look as if it was intended for Facebook.
3. The user authenticates to Facebook and clicks the authorization but-
ton. An authorization response is generated by Facebook and sent to
the BBC.
4. The authors assume that at this point the BBC will process this re-
sponse as if it was generated by EvilCo; as a result it will send the re-
ceived access token to EvilCo to retrieve the required user information.
As a result, the attacker (EvilCo) will discover the user’s access token
for Facebook, and can then use this access token to retrieve sensitive
user information from Facebook.
However, Step 4 will not proceed as the above description suggests, since
the authorization response generated by Facebook in Step 3 will be redi-
rected to the redirect uri that the BBC registered with Facebook, not the
redirect uri that the BBC registered with EvilCo. Thus the BBC will know
where the authorization response comes from and will only submit the ac-
cess token to Facebook.
3 Conclusion
Our main conclusion is that the IdP Mix-Up attack cannot work on RPs
that support two or more IdPs. As a result, it is far from clear whether any
mitigations need to be added to the OAuth specifications.
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Interestingly, the issue raised by the workability of this attack sheds light
on the interactions between formal models of security protocols and the
protocols themselves. The attack we have discussed above was discovered
by Fett, Ku¨sters and Schmitz, [1], through their formal modelling of the
OAuth protocol. It appears that the attack does work in their model of
the protocol, whereas we believe the attack will not work because certain
assumptions underlying the model do not apply in practice. That is, because
the model does not perfectly correspond to the real-life protocol, as is very
often the case for such mathematical models, then an attack that is valid in
the model is not a genuine threat in practice.
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